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MARKET POWER AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT: SOME
EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH HOTEL INDUSTRY*
Nerea Ferna¨ndez{ and Pedro L. Mariè n{
This paper analyses the e¡ect of multimarket contact on ¢rms'
behaviour. According to Bernheim and Whinston [1990], ¢rms that
meet in several markets for an in¢nite number of periods may ¢nd it
pro¢table to redistribute market power among markets where they are
operating. We present evidence supporting this prediction by using
data from the Spanish hotel industry. Moreover, we also ¢nd that the
omission of variables measuring multimarket contact creates a
downward bias on the e¡ect of concentration on prices. This result
questions previous conclusions about the role of competition in
industries where multimarket behaviour is expected.
i. introduction
Multimarket competition is de¢ned as `a situation where ¢rms compete
with each other simultaneously in several markets' (Karnani and Wernerfelt
[1985]). This situation is present in multiproduct industries or industries
with di¡erent geographic markets. While the literature has concentrated
on di¡erent aspects of this phenomenon, such as the presence of economies
of scope, demand externalities and cross-subsidization, the e¡ect of
multimarket competition on the presence of tacit collusion has received
little attention. The possibility that multimarket contact could promote
anticompetitive outcomes was ¢rst raised in 1955 by Corwin Edwards,
who wrote:
`When one large conglomerate enterprise competes with another, the two
are likely to encounter each other in a considerable number of markets. The
multiplicity of their contact may blunt the edge of their competition'.
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This traditional view about the e¡ects of multimarket contact has been
recently revised by Bernheim and Whinston [1990], who analyze in detail
the e¡ects of multimarket contact on ¢rms' behaviour. In their model,
¢rms expect to compete over an in¢nite number of periods in a set of
di¡erent markets and the penalty for deviating from the collusive outcome
in any market k is felt in all markets where the deviating ¢rm meets its
market k rivals. They show that the existence of this contact may imply
that ¢rms not only increase their power to collude in general terms but
they may also ¢nd it pro¢table to design strategic policies and redistribute
market power among markets where they are operating, so that total pro¢t
maximization can be achieved by giving up pro¢ts in markets where more
collusive outcomes are reachable in order to facilitate collusion and
increase pro¢ts in more competitive markets.
The main assumptions needed for this type of result to hold are the
following. First, there is a set of ¢rms operating in several markets or
product lines and some of these ¢rms meet in more than one market.
Second, full collusion is not achievable in at least one market, i.e., any ¢rm
would have incentives to deviate from the fully collusive strategy given
the other players' strategies. Third, either markets di¡er in some
characteristics that a¡ect the outcome of the game, such as the number of
competitors and the toughness of competition, or ¢rms have market
speci¢c characteristics such as their cost structure. In other words, if the
same ¢rms were competing in identical markets, the equilibrium would not
be a¡ected by the existence of multimarket contact. On the other hand,
the result is robust to changes in the ¢rms' choice variable, the shape of
the cost and demand functions and the length and toughness of the penalty
imposed on deviating ¢rms.
Phillips and Mason [1992] conduct a series of experiments which support
these results. Additionally, a few empirical papers have attempted to
measure the multimarket contact e¡ects. For instance, Evans and Kessides
[1994] examine empirically the e¡ects of multimarket contact on pricing
in the US airline industry. The analysis of the time-series and cross-
sectional variability of airline fares in the largest US city-pair routes
reveals that fares are higher in city-pair markets served by carriers with
extensive inter-route contacts. Similarly, Parker and RÎller [1997] estimate
a structural model of ¢rms' behaviour in the mobile telephone industry
and ¢nd that multimarket contact signi¢cantly increases collusion.
However, none of these papers tests Bernheim and Whinston's hypothesis
about the strategic e¡ects of multimarket contact.
The approach we consider in the paper is as follows. Consider a set
of ¢rms that operate and meet in more than one market. Assume that
these ¢rms expect to play an in¢nitely repeated game in each market that
is determined by the characteristics of the ¢rms and the market under
study (the focal market) and also by the number of contacts and the
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characteristics of the market where the contacts take place (the contact
market). Accordingly, we can write the equilibrium value for the choice
variable as the result of three multiplicative components, namely its
equilibrium value in the stage game, a term depending on the discount
factor, and one depending on the degree of multimarket contact and the
ease of collusion in both the focal and the contact market. To proxy
multimarket contact for one speci¢c ¢rm and market, we aggregate the
number of contacts that the ¢rm has in other markets with its
competitors in the focal market, giving di¡erent weights to the contact
depending on the characteristics of the market where it takes place.
For the empirical test of multimarket contact e¡ects, we use a data set
from the Spanish hotel industry which includes all the hotels and boarding
houses with three or more stars operating in Spain. Our decision has been
based on the importance of the chains operating in this industry, with
almost 33% of the hotels belonging to a chain. We use a cross-section data
base describing the prices and characteristics of 2221 hotels and boarding
houses across 83 di¡erent geographic markets in Spain in 1996.1 With this
data set, we estimate the e¡ect of multimarket contact on prices by using
the generalized least squares estimation procedure.
We obtain two main results. First, our analysis of the data reveals that
the omission of variables measuring multimarket contact creates a
downward bias on the e¡ect of concentration on prices. Second, the
evidence gives strong support to Bernheim and Whinston's hypothesis that
in the presence of multimarket contact, prices rise in markets where it is
di¤cult to collude and decrease in markets where it is easier to achieve
collusive outcomes.
ii. review of the literature
It is a well known result that ¢rms can achieve more collusive outcomes
when they expect to meet and compete for an in¢nite number of periods.
To achieve these outcomes, the ¢rms involved must design a set of
penalties for deviating players. For instance, if a ¢rm decides to deviate
from the collusive outcome, the penalty imposed could consist of reverting
for the remainder of the game to the equilibrium strategy for the stage
game, since this is also a subgame perfect equilibrium in the repeated
game.
Assume a market where N ¢rms producing di¡erentiated products
compete in prices and denote the equilibrium prices in the one shot game
by pi , i  1; . . . ;N. Consider this as the stage game of an in¢nitely
repeated game. Now ¢rms have the possibility of choosing a set of
1 See the Appendix.
3
alternative prices. Denote by p0i the price for ¢rm i which maximizes the
present discounted value of the ¢rm's expected £ow of pro¢ts subject to
the following incentive constraint
1 p0i
1
1ÿ d  piRip
0
ÿi; p0ÿi  pi
d
1ÿ d
where pi and p
0
i are ¢rm i's pro¢ts when prices are p

i and p
0
i respectively,
piRip0ÿ1; p0ÿi are ¢rm i's pro¢ts when all ¢rms other that i set their
collusive prices, p0ÿi, and ¢rm i chooses its best response to them, Rip0ÿi,
and d 2 0; 1 is the discount factor.
Notice that given product heterogeneity the maximum sustainable price,
denoted by pi , is an increasing function of the discount factor, d.
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Assuming that ¢rms set p0i  minfpmi ; pi g, where pmi is ¢rm i's monopoly
price, then p0i is a non decreasing function of d. At any given d, p
0
i will
depend on the same cost and demand conditions that determine pi .
Accordingly we could express p0i as a separable function of the equilibrium
price in the stage game and a function of the discount factor, p0i  Fdpi ,
where Fd 2 1; minf pmi ;pi g
pi

.
Bernheim and Whinston [1990] generalize this analysis to cases in which
¢rms meet and compete in more than one market, i.e., there is multimarket
contact. The crucial assumption here is that any ¢rm that breaks the
collusive agreement in any market k triggers the penalty in all the markets
where it meets its market k rivals. Assuming K di¡erent markets, the
incentive constraint becomes:
2
XK
k1
p0ik
1
1ÿ dk

XK
k1
pikRikp0ÿik; p0ÿik  pik
dk
1ÿ dk
 
i.e., given that the punishment is going to spread over all the markets,
when a ¢rm decides to deviate from the collusive outcome it does so in all
the markets where it operates.
From this expression Bernheim and Whinston [1990] derive several
interesting results. Firstly, for identical markets and ¢rms' characteristics
across markets, both pro¢ts and losses from deviating are multiplied by
the number of markets where the ¢rms are meeting, and the set of
strategies that form subgame perfect equilibria remains unchanged. This is
denoted as the irrelevance result.
Secondly, when markets di¡er or ¢rms have market speci¢c characteris-
tics, we can obtain a larger set of equilibria for each market that still
includes all the equilibrium strategies available in absence of multimarket
contact. In particular, a ¢rm can reach more collusive outcomes in some
markets by violating condition (1) so long as this condition holds in other
2 See Bernheim and Whinston [1990].
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markets as a strict inequality, i.e., when pi > p
m
i , and condition (2) holds
for the whole set of markets where the ¢rm operates.
Thirdly, ¢rms can do more than this. Assume that condition (1) holds
as an equality for all the markets where the ¢rm is operating, i.e. in all the
markets pi < p
m
i . In this case, ¢rms can reduce their price in some markets
so that condition (1) in these market holds now as a strict inequality. By
doing so they can increase prices in other markets, violating condition (1),
as long as condition (2) still holds. In fact, Bernheim and Whinston
[1990] show that ¢rms may ¢nd it pro¢table to reduce their prices in
markets where they achieve more collusive outcomes in order to increase
them in other markets with more competition as long as the extra pro¢ts
from the second set of markets are greater than the pro¢ts forgone in the
¢rst set of markets. This is the most common case since for most demand
and cost functions the number of units a¡ected by the change in prices is
smaller in the former than in the latter set of markets.
Thus, the existence of multimarket contact not only implies that ¢rms
may increase their power to collude in general terms but also that they
may strategically transfer their power to collude from very collusive
markets to other markets where collusion is more di¤cult to sustain.
Accordingly, we can represent ¢rm i's equilibrium price in market k as
3 p0ik  GMMCikFdkpik
where GMMCik measures the e¡ect of multimarket contact. According
to Bernheim and Whinston's [1990] predictions, we expect to observe
GMMCik > 1 in markets with less ease of collusion and GMMCik < 1 in
markets with greater ease of collusion.
iii. econometric specification
The behaviour of the ¢rms in the hotel industry can be represented
according to a sequential decision process. At the ¢rst stage, ¢rms decide
if they want to open an establishment in a particular location and
simultaneously they choose their capacity and quality in that location.
Table AI in the Appendix reveals that ¢rms do not change either capacities
or qualities for very long periods so that these can be regarded as long
run decision. At the second stage, ¢rms compete in prices and earn pro¢ts.
This process can be solved by backward induction. When competition
takes place at the last stage, ¢rms take the establishments' locations,
capacities and qualities as given.
In the previous section we have shown that in the context of an in¢nitely
repeated game, the equilibrium price for ¢rm i in market k, p0ik, can be
represented as a function of its equilibrium price in the stage game, pik, a
mark-up on this price which depends on the discount factor, d, and one
term depending on the degree of multimarket contact and the ease of
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collusion in both the focal and the contact market. In turn, the set of pik
is determined by the cost function, cqik;wik, which depends on the level of
output and the input prices, and market and product characteristics such
as the price-demand elasticity, Zik, the market concentration, Hk,
3 and the
product's quality, uik.
The exogenous variables which try to measure all the arguments
mentioned above are the following.4 Among the cost variables we include
the variable DD to measure market demand. This variable is included in
the regression as an instrument for the ¢rm's sales which are clearly
endogenous. To avoid further endogeneity problems in the regressions, we
include one period lagged values for this variable. At the same time, this
variable controls for market di¡erences that could a¡ect the discount
factor, d, for example, the level of demand may a¡ect ¢rms expectations
about the future. We also include the variable Wages to measure input
prices as labour is the most important input in the industry. The variable
Wages is measured at the market level so it does not account for di¡erences
among ¢rms in the same market. Accordingly, this variable should be
interpreted as a market variable that could also be proxying exogenous
characteristics related to market economic activity.
The variable Dist proxies ¢rm i's price-demand elasticity. This variable
is a normalized measure of the average distance in terms of product
category between any given establishment and its rivals in the same
geographical market. Therefore, it proxies the degree of substitutability
for ¢rm i's services in the same area. Larger values of Dist imply that ¢rm
i's rivals supply worse substitutes for the ¢rm's services and so ¢rm i faces
a less elastic demand. We did also control for other characteristics that
could measure price-demand elasticity such as the nature of the market
but none of them turned out to be signi¢cant so that we dropped them out
from the ¢nal speci¢cation of the model.5
Concentration in market k is measured by the variable HI. This variable
is an instrument for the Her¢ndahl index of concentration which is
potentially endogenous since it includes ¢rm i's own sales in the market.
To solve this problem we use capacity installed as an instrument for sales.
Capacity is highly correlated with sales while it cannot be correlated with
3 For a wide class of oligopolistic competition models there exists a non positive
relationship between market concentration and price. The joint pro¢t maximization model
can be regarded as a limiting case in which prices do not change after the entry of new
competitors. Bertrand with homogeneous goods can be regarded as the other limiting case
since the entry of a second ¢rm drives prices down to marginal costs. For the remaining
models prices fall with market concentration (see Sutton, [1991]).
4 A detailed de¢nition of all the variables included in the empirical model is provided in
the Appendix.
5 For instance we included a set of dummy variables for di¡erent types of markets such as
business cities, sea-resorts, high mountain-resorts, rural areas and historical towns, but their
coe¤cients were not signi¢cantly di¡erent from each other.
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the error term since it is a long run decision given to the ¢rm when it sets
its prices. Accordingly we construct HI as a Her¢ndahl index using the
capacity values.
Two variables measure the quality of the hotel. First, its reported
category in the Tourist Guide, which we call Category. Second, the
minimum between either the age of the hotel or the time that has elapsed
since the hotel was last refurbished, Age: This variable is included in log
form in the regressions, as consumers value more age di¡erences between
newer than between older hotels. As quality is a long run decision, we
consider it as exogenous when the hotel sets its price every period.6
For the purpose of this paper, the most important independent variable
is the one describing multimarket contact. To proxy this variable, we take
every hotel in every market k (the focal market) and we aggregate the
contacts that this hotel has in other markets m (the contact markets) with
its market k competitors, given di¡erent weights to the contact depending
on the characteristics of the market where it takes place. In particular, we
weight each contact by a measure of concentration in the contact market,
HI, because the fewer ¢rms in the market, the softer the competition and
the higher the pro¢ts. Given that punishments started in more
concentrated markets a¡ect ¢rms' pro¢ts more negatively, ¢rms care more
about these contacts.7 Then, we aggregate the number of contacts with
each competitor from the focal market and divide this value by the number
of rival ¢rms in the focal market, thus providing the ¢rm's average
multimarket contact with its rivals in that market, AVMMCik:
Provided with this measure of multimarket contact and de¢ning
OMMCik  logGMMCik), we consider two di¡erent speci¢cations for
OMMCik. Firstly,
4 OMMCik  b1AV MMCik;
which is independent of the characteristics of the focal market. This
speci¢cation can allow us to test the sign and signi¢cance of the e¡ect that
the variable measuring multimarket contact has on prices in average
terms. A positive and signi¢cant sign for b1 would be consistent with the
traditional view on multimarket contact, but it could also be measuring
the e¡ects of omitted variables highly related to multimarket contact, such
as the establishment size or its perceived quality.
6 In a previous speci¢cation of the empirical model, we also included a dummy variable
equal to 1 for ¢rms working with tour operators and 0 otherwise. We dropped this variable
out from the ¢nal speci¢cation presented here since it was not signi¢cant in the regressions.
7We contrast this variable against an alternative variable that gives the same weight to all
the contacts and we reject the null hypothesis that giving di¡erent weights to the contacts does
not improve the goodness of the estimation.
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Secondly,
5 OMMCik  bkAV MMCik
where the assumption in (4) is now relaxed to allow for heterogeneity of
the multimarket contact e¡ect across markets: The e¡ect of a speci¢c
contact in market k can be stated as a function of the ease of collusion in
the market, measured by HIk, in a way which represents the transfer of
market power. We use HIk, which is an instrument for the Her¢ndahl
index of concentration, to measure ease of collusion since most models of
oligopolistic competition forecast that the higher the market
concentration, the more collusive the output of the repeated game.8
Following Gimeno and Woo [1995], we specify bk as
bk  b1  b2HIk
Therefore, we can rewrite (5) as
6 OMMCik  b1AV MMCik  b2HIkAV MMCik
According to Bernheim and Whinston [1990], we expect to observe
b1 > 0, which means that in markets with a small capacity for collusion,
i.e., low HIk, MMC has a positive e¡ect on prices. This e¡ect has to
decrease as the ease of collusion, measured by HIk, increases, and we thus
expect b2 < 0. Additionally, we expect bk to be equal to zero for a value
of HIk between the minimum and the maximum values in our set of
observations. Summing up, the e¡ect of multimarket contact is expected to
be greater in absolute terms if the variable measuring the ease of collusion
in the focal market, HIk, is among either the largest or the smallest in the
sample, being positive in markets with very low values for HIk and
negative in markets with very high values for HIk.
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Accordingly, the price equation can be speci¢ed as follows
7 logPriceik  b0  OMMCik  b3 logDDk  b4 logWagesk
 b5Distik  b6HIk b7Categoryik b8 logAgeik  uik
where OMMCik is speci¢ed above and uikt is the error term.
8We have also tried other variables but they provided either worse or insigni¢cant results.
These variables are the following. First, the rate of demand growth since rapid growth makes
the consequences of punishment (which occurs in the future) more important relative to the
gain from deviating (which is instantaneous). So, in a market with high growth rate, the ease
of collusion is expected to be greater. Second, the variance of the demand and, third, the entry
of new competitors in the market during the last two years since higher instability of demand
or a large proportion of entries make collusion more di¤cult. See Tirole [1988, pp. 245^253]
for a more detailed explanation regarding the e¡ects of these variables on the ease of
collusion.
9We have also tested more complicated speci¢cations, such as quadratic functions, for the
term measuring multimarket contact but the main results remained unchanged.
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We estimate the model applying generalized least squares after ¢nding
that the residuals from the ordinary least squares estimation were
heteroscedastic according to the Breusch and Pagan test.
iv. results and interpretation
Table I provides the results of estimating the empirical model. Column
(1) presents the results for the price equation (7) assuming that there
are no multimarket contact e¡ects, i.e., when OMMCik is not included
in the regression. The interest of this equation is twofold. First, it tests
the suitability of the model for the Spanish hotel industry. Second, it
allows us to compare these results with those that we obtain after
introducing multimarket contact e¡ects in the model and to study
misspeci¢cation e¡ects on the estimates. The coe¤cients for all the
variables, except HI, are signi¢cant and have the expected signs. The
price is higher in hotels which are newer and of a higher category, which
Table I
Price Equation
Dependent Variable  logPriceik
Generalized Least Squares
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.03 1.67 1.77
(2.48) (2.04) (2.17)
logDDk 0.01 0.02 0.02
(3.27) (4.25) (4.20)
logWagesk 0.52 0.54 0.53
(7.75) (8.09) (8.02)
Distik 0.37 0.37 0.36
(3.21) (3.24) (3.11)
HIk 0.14 0.17 0.22
(1.23) (1.52) (1.91)
Categoryik 0.38 0.37 0.37
(24.54) (23.51) (23.40)
logAgeik ÿ0.03 ÿ0.03 ÿ0.03
(ÿ3.21) (ÿ3.99) (ÿ3.91)
AVMMCik 0.22 0.38
(5.69) (5.36)
HIkAV MMCik ÿ1.95
(ÿ3.07)
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.42 0.42
F 257.80 227.20 200.15
Degrees of freedom (6, 2214) (7, 2213) (8, 2212)
No. of observations 2221 2221 2221
Note: t-tests in parenthesis.
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face a more inelastic demand, and in areas where wages and demand
are higher. It is important to notice that the coe¤cient of the
concentration variable, HI, is not signi¢cant, although its sign is as
expected, suggesting that in this industry, concentration has no e¡ect on
prices. However, this may be due to the omission of the multimarket
contact variable. So, the erroneous speci¢cation of the model would
lead to wrong conclusions.
Column (2) presents the results of estimating the price equation (7)
when we include multimarket contact de¢ned as in equation (4), i.e., when
its e¡ect is independent of the characteristics of the focal market. The
coe¤cient for the multimarket variable, AVMMC, is positive and
signi¢cant at a level of 1%. This result suggests that multimarket contact
contributes to a reduction in rivalry among the ¢rms in the industry, which
is the expected e¡ect according to the traditional view. Nevertheless, the
observed positive e¡ect might be due to the fact that hotels having more
contacts, which are those belonging to a chain, are bigger on average terms
and have more market power owing to their larger size. In fact, this is
consistent with the ¢gures on output, employment and number of rooms
provided in the Appendix. Another explanation of this e¡ect could be the
policy of giving an incentive, usually a free stay, to a frequent customer
after she has conducted a certain amount of business with the hotel chain.
The obvious way to control for this e¡ect is to include the size of the chain
to which the hotel belongs to as an explanatory variable in the regression.
However, this is not possible given its high correlation with AVMMC
r  0:74. In any case, this signi¢cant correlation strongly supports our
hypothesis.10
Column (3) presents the result of the estimation when we consider the
interaction between the ease of collusion in the focal market and
multimarket contact as in equation (6), the variable measuring the ease of
collusion being HI. Our hypothesis focuses on the e¡ects of multimarket
contact on markets with a di¡erent ease of collusion. According to the
theory, in the presence of multimarket contact, prices are expected to fall in
markets where it is easier to reach collusive outcomes whilst they are
expected to increase where it is more di¤cult to collude. In order to identify
this non-homogeneous e¡ect, a linear interaction between concentration in
the focal market and multimarket contact is speci¢ed. It can be seen that
the coe¤cient for AVMMCik, b1, is positive and the coe¤cient for HIk
AVMMCik, b2, is negative, both of them being signi¢cant at the 1% level.
The predicted iteration e¡ects are shown in Figure 1 where we can observe
that the e¡ect of multimarket contact on price remains positive until HIk
reaches the value 0.19. Given that the sample average for HIk is 0.16 and
10 See Gimeno and Woo [1994] for a test of these e¡ects on the unidirectional coe¤cient
of AVMMC.
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the sample median value is 0.09, this result gives strong support to
Bernheim andWhinston's [1990] predictions.
We should also notice that once we have introduced the multimarket
contact variables the coe¤cient of HI becomes signi¢cant. This suggests
that the previous conclusions about the role of concentration in the
industry resulted from a misspeci¢cation of the model. In fact, once we
control for the multimarket contact strategic e¡ects, we observe that prices
are signi¢cantly higher in more concentrated markets
We have estimated the same three regressions for each of the ¢ve
di¡erent categories in the sample11 and the main results hold for each
subsample, though some variables become less signi¢cant mainly due to
the small number of observations for some categories.
v. conclusions
The hypothesis thatmultimarket contacts increase the ability of ¢rms to attain
and sustain tacit collusive agreements in any single market was articulated
for the ¢rst time in Edwards [1955]. In a recent theoretical contribution,
11 In these regressions we omitted the variable Category from the regression.
Figure 1
Ease of collusion e¡ect on prices through multimarket contact
Note: Ease of collusion is measured by the variable HI
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Bernheim and Whinston [1990] provide some guidance as to appropriate
strategies for empirically examining the e¡ects ofmultimarket contact.
In this paper, we examine the e¡ects of multimarket contact on pricing
in the Spanish hotel industry. In particular, we estimate a reduced form
price equation which depends on market and ¢rm characteristics, future
expectations and multimarket contact, taking as given variables involving
¢rms' long run decisions. This approach su¡ers from two limitations that
could not be solved because of the nature of the data. Firstly, we could not
incorporate data on demand variables so that we could not estimate the
structural parameters from the price and demand equations and secondly,
the analysis could not be extended in order to incorporate dynamic aspects
and endogenize long run decision variables.
Despite these shortcomings, it is possible to derive two relevant results
from our analysis. Firstly, it reveals that the omission of variables
measuring multimarket contact creates a downward bias on the e¡ect of
concentration on prices. Hence in industries where multimarket contact
takes place, this type of erroneous speci¢cation in modelling the behavior
of the ¢rms may lead to a wrong conclusion about the strength of ¢rms'
market power in the industry.
Secondly, we ¢nd relevant strategic multimarket e¡ects. In particular,
in the presence of multimarket contact, prices are higher in markets where
it is di¤cult to collude and lower in markets where collusion is easier to
achieve. Thus, we interpret our results as evidence supporting Bernheim
and Whinston's [1990] hypothesis in the context of this industry. To our
knowledge this is the ¢rst time that this hypothesis has been purposely
empirically tested and signi¢cant results have been found. This implies that
antitrust authorities should worry not only about mergers that increase
market concentration but also about those that increase multimarket
contact among the ¢rms operating in the market, even if market
concentration remains unchanged. In other words, multimarket contact
should be taken into account when taking antitrust decisions.
appendix: the data and definitions of the variables
The sample is taken from the 1996 Spanish Professional Hotel Guide published
by the Instituto de Estudios Tur|¨sticos (Institute of Tourist Studies). This data base
includes 9482 establishments, distributed in the following categories: vacation city,
hotel, apartment hotel, residential hotel, boarding house, residential boarding
house, motel, and apartment residence. Given the heterogeneity of the services
provided by these establishments, we center the study on a segment of the industry
which only includes hotels and boarding houses with 3 or more stars. If we reject
those establishments with incomplete data or having been built before 1900 and
never having been refurbished, we obtain a cross section sample with 2221 hotels
and boarding houses.
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The establishments classi¢ed as hotels include independent (82.2%) and non
independent hotels (17.8%). Establishments in the second group belong to 106
di¡erent hotel chains. In 1994, the hotel industry gave employment to 159,000
persons and its output, which is de¢ned as the set of incomes generated from the
di¡erent types of services they o¡er, had a value of approximately 7,600 million
dollars, representing 1.4% of the Spanish GDP. Hotels belonging to chains
represented 35% and 43% of total employment and output, respectively. Thus on
average, establishments belonging to a chain are larger than independent hotels.
Table AI shows the age distribution of the establishments included in the sample.
We can see that more than two thirds of them are more than 4 years old. Table
AII presents the distribution between independent and chain hotels by number of
establishments and bed capacity and shows that almost one half of 4^5 star hotels
belong to a hotel chain while for 3 star hotels this percentage falls to one third. In
particular, in our sample 32.8% of the establishments belong to a chain. The ¢gures
on the number of rooms also show that chain hotels are on average larger than
independent hotels. Finally, Table AIII shows the size distribution of the 106 chains
operating in Spain according to the Professional Hotel Guide. More than one half
Table AI
Age Distribution of Establishments
Age No. of Establishments % 3 4 5
Less than 5 years 721 0.32 480 218 23
5 to 9 years 607 0.27 417 173 17
10 to 20 years 261 0.11 183 73 5
More than 20 years 632 0.28 522 99 11
Table AIII
Size Distribution of Hotel Chains
Less than 5 hotels 58
5 to 19 hotels 38
20 to 49 hotels 6
50 to 99 hotels 3
More than 99 hotels 1
Table AII
Distribution Between Independent and Chain Hotels by Number of
Establishments and Capacity
Stars No. of
hotels
% of hotels belonging
to a chain
No. of
rooms
% of rooms in hotels
belonging to a chain
5 62 48.4 11,830 57.3
4 616 51.3 103,058 55.2
3 1,721 28.1 211,781 40.1
2 1,511 4.8 83,897 14.0
1 1,383 2.8 47,129 14.4
Total 5,293 17.8 457,695 36.5
Note: This sample only includes establishments classi¢ed as hotels.
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of the chains are small, with less than ¢ve establishments, but the four largest
chains have more than 50 establishments each. This fact gives an idea about the
important di¡erences in multimarket contact across chains.
As Evans and Kessides [1994] suggest: `In empirical tests of the multimarket
contact hypotheses, an appropriate de¢nition of the market is of paramount
importance.' In the case of the Spanish hotel industry, markets are quite well
de¢ned, and there is little ad hoc intervention on the part of the researcher. This is
because the Spanish National Institute of Statistics, and the corresponding
Department of Tourism of each regional administrative unit provide a division of
the Spanish territory in 83 di¡erent geographic markets according to the tourism
and business characteristics of their di¡erent areas. In particular, the main business
and tourist towns (such as Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Granada, Benidorm and
Marbella among others) and mountainous areas are regarded as independent
markets. Moreover, in coastal provinces, towns are split into inner and seafront
areas, and the Balearic and Canary Islands are divided into di¡erent islands and
also according to the criteria mentioned above.
The Professional Hotel Guide provides data at hotel level including the following
information: city and location in the city that can be either the city center or the
outskirts, year of construction or last renovation, number of beds and rooms,
prices of all types of rooms, number of stars of the hotel, services provided by the
hotel (swimming pool, conference room, 24 hours service, etc.), equipment in the
bedroom (TV, hi-¢ set, minibar, hair dryer, etc.), whether the establishment
belongs or not to a chain, and if it does, to which, and whether the hotels works
with tour operators or not. Data on wages and market demand have been provided
by the Bank of Spain Research Department, the Spanish National Institute of
Statistics and the corresponding Department of Tourism of each regional
administrative unit.
Given this information, we calculate the following variables:
Age.- 1996 minus the year of construction or last renovation. We take logs of this
variable so we value more the age di¡erences in newer than in older hotels.
Category.- Dummy variable with values ranging from 1 to 5 constructed by
ordering the hotels in ¢ve categories from lower to higher as follows: 3 stars-silver,
3 stars-gold, 4 stars-gold, 5 stars-gold and 5 stars-luxury.
DD.- Number of stays in 1994 disaggregating by geographical markets, except for
Balearic Islands.
Dist.- We construct this variable measuring quality distance as
Dist ik 
P
j 6iCategoryi ÿ Categoryj2
q

16Nÿ 1p
This variable measures the average distance in terms of category between each
hotel and its competitors in the market and it is normalized by the maximum
possible distance in that speci¢c market.12
HI.- Instrument for the Her¢ndahl index of concentration which is constructed
using installed capacity for each establishment, where installed capacity is regarded
as an instrument for sales.
12We have also calculated measures of spatial distance and size distance which we do not
include in the ¢nal speci¢cation of the model because either they are not signi¢cant or they
are correlated with other relevant explanatory variables.
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Multimarket Contact.- An instance of multimarket contact occurs, according to
our de¢nition, when a hotel i and its competitor j in the focal market k, also meet
in a di¡erent market m. If an event of multimarket contact occurs Contactij;km  1;
otherwise Contactij;km  0.
We de¢ne the measure of multimarket contact, MMC, as
MMCij;km  Contactij;kmHIm
i.e., we assign a di¡erent value to the contacts depending on the degree of
concentration in the contact market m.
The measure of multimarket contact is the weighted average number of
multimarket contacts with the competitors in the focal market which is calculated
as follows:
AV MMCik 
1
T Cik
X
j 6i
X
m6k
MMCij;km
where T Cik is the number of ¢rm i's competitors in the focal market.
Price.- High season price of a double room (VAT not included) with a full
bathroom. The reason for choosing this speci¢c price is that this type of room is
most representative of the sample and low season prices are signi¢cantly correlated
to high season prices (r  0:91).
Wages.- Wages for the 4th quarter of 1994, disaggregated by administrative
regions, computed as the total payment per worker per month.
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